Helen W. Boyer v. Thomas Vern Boyer, Carrie Gibson Boyer, Fewkes Canyon, LLC : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Helen W. Boyer v. Thomas Vern Boyer, Carrie
Gibson Boyer, Fewkes Canyon, LLC : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert H. Wilde; Attorney for Boyers; John Braithwaite; Plant, Christensen & Kanell; Attorney for
Green.
Ray G. Martineau; Anthony R. Martineau; Brett D. Cragun; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Boyer v. Boyer, No. 20061163 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/7040
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HELEN W. BOYER, Trustee, \ 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
v. ] 
THOMAS VERN BOYER; CARRIE ; 
GIBSON BOYER; FEWKES ; 
CANYON, L.L.C., a Limited Liability ; 
Company; JEREMY BOYER; and ; 
KIMBERLY BOYER, ; 
Defendants/ Appellees. ] 
) BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
) DANNIE GREEN 
) Case No. 20061163-CA 
Appeal from the Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, 
Honorable Bruce Lubeck 
Ray G. Martineau John N. Braithwaite 
Anthony R. Martineau PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Brett D. Cragun 136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 Attorneys For Appellee Dannie Green 
Attorneys For Appellants 
Robert H. Wilde 
935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D-102 
Midvale,Utah 84047 
Attorneys For Appellees Boyers 
and Fewkes Canyon 
FILED 
ymH APPELLATE COURTS 
ACT 1 J ?fffl7 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HELEN W. BOYER, Trustee, \ 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
v. ] 
THOMAS VERN BOYER; CARRIE ; 
GIBSON BOYER; FEWKES ; 
CANYON, L.L.C., a Limited Liability ; 
Company; JEREMY BOYER; and ; 
KIMBERLY BOYER, ; 
Defendants/Appellees. ] 
) BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
) DANNIE GREEN 
) Case No. 20061163-CA 
Appeal from the Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, 
Honorable Bruce Lubeck 
Ray G. Martineau John N. Braithwaite 
Anthony R. Martineau PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Brett D. Cragun 136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 Attorneys For Appellee Dannie Green 
Attorneys For Appellants 
Robert H. Wilde 
935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorneys For Appellees Boyers 
and Fewkes Canyon 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Attorneys for Appellant Helen W. Boyer 
John N. Braithwaite 
Plant, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel: (801)363-7611 
Attorney for Appellee Dannie Green 
Robert H. Wilde 
935 East South Union Avenue, 
Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Appellees Thomas Boyer 
and Fewkes Canyon, LLC 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Nature of the Case 3 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. HELEN BOYER HAD NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
GREEN, AND DID NOT USE OR RELY UPON GREEN'S SURVEY. 
AS A NON-RELIANT THIRD PARTY WITH NO CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONSHIP, HELEN BOYER'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
AGAINST GREEN FAILS 11 
II. THE CASES RELIED UPON BY HELEN BOYER DO NOT SUPPORT 
HER CLAIM AGAINST GREEN, AS SHE WAS A NON-RELIANT 
THIRD PARTY, HAVING NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP 
WITH GREEN 18 
III. AFTER A TRIAL OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE ADJOINING 
LANDOWNERS, THE DISTRICT COURT DETERMINED THAT 
GREEN'S SURVEY WAS NOT OUTSIDE THE STANDARDS OF 
THE PROFESSION 25 
IV. HELEN BOYER FAILED TO PROVE ANY DAMAGES, AND IS 
PRECLUDED BY THE LAW OF THE CASE OR BY THE DOCTRINE 
OF ISSUE PRECLUSION FROM RELITIGATING THE ISSUE OF 
DAMAGES 30 
i 
V. THE APPELLANT, HELEN BOYER, HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES 31 
CONCLUSION 32 
ADDENDUM 
Certified Copy of Affidavit of Dannie B. Green on file with 
the Summit County Surveyor as Survey No. S0006440 Exhibit 1 
District Court's Ruling and Order, dated February 7, 2006 Exhibit 2 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Utah 1979) .2 
Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) 19, 20 
Buehner Block Co. v. U. W.C. Assoc, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988) 2 
Bushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1976) 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 24 
Carlotta v. T R. Stark & Associates, Inc., 470 A.2d 838 (Md. App. 1984) 13, 17 
Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah App. 1987) 28 
DeCapua v. Lambacher, 663 N.E. 2d 972 (Ohio App. 1995) 12, 17, 22, 24 
Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, 94 P.3d 193 2, 32 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994) 16 
Gipson v. Slagle, 820 S.W. 2d 595 (Mo. App. 1991) 12, 13, 17, 22, 24 
Goodsel v. Dept. of Business Reg., 523 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1974) 2 
Hutchinson v. Dubeau, 289 S.E. 2d4(Ga. App. 1982) 19 
In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996) 2, 29 
Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, 989 P.2d 61 2, 29 
Kent v. Bartlett, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Cal. App. 1975) 19 
Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah App. 1991) 3 
Lindey's Inc. v. Goodover, 872 P.2d 764 (Mont. 1994) 13, 17, 22, 24 
Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 
713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986) 22, 23, 24 
Ramsey v. Hancock, 2003 UT App 319, 79 P.3d 423 12 
iii 
Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E. 2d 656 (111. 1969) 14, 18 
SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assoc, Inc., 
2001 UT 54, 28 P.3d 669 22 
Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322 1 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) 28 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988) 28 
West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, 139 P.3d 1059 22, 23, 24 
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 1177 3, 29 
Young v. Salt Lake City School District, 2002 UT 64, 52 P.3d 1230 11 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-23-17 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
Rules Cited 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 52(a) 3, 29 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56 3 
Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b) 16 
Other Authorities Cited 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 552 12, 15, 22, 23 
IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
With respect to Dannie Green ("Green"), this appeal raises the following issues: 
1. Did the District Court correctly conclude that Helen Boyer, as a non-reliant 
third party with no contractual relationship with Green, could not maintain a negligence 
claim against Green? 
2. Did the District Court err in its determination, after a trial of the issues 
between the adjoining landowners, that Green's survey complied with the standards of 
the profession? 
3. Did the District Court err in its determination that the Appellant failed to 
sustain its burden of proof on damages? 
4. May the Appellant challenge the factual findings of the trial court without 
marshaling the evidence to show that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the 
findings even when viewed in the light most favorable to the findings? 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review on issue no. 1 above is correction of 
error. This Court reviews the District Court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness. Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, f 12, 979 P.2d 322. 
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The standard of appellate review on the District Court's factual findings on issue 
no. 2 and issue no. 3 is the clearly erroneous standard. In reviewing the District Court's 
factual findings, this Court should not disturb the factual findings unless they were 
clearly erroneous. Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, 989 P.2d 61. The clearly 
erroneous standard does not permit findings to be overturned unless the great weight of 
the evidence contradicts the finding. In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 
1996). 
Although this Court reviews the District Court decision on issues of law for 
correctness without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, under 
standards of appellate review, this Court should affirm the District Court if its decision is 
sustainable on any proper ground. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
Under the rules of appellate review, we affirm the trial court if we can 
do so on any proper ground even if the court below assigned an 
incorrect reason for its ruling. 
Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979). See also, Buehner Block Co. 
v. U. W.C. Assoc, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988). This rule of appellate review applies even if 
the proper ground was not raised in or considered by the lower court, and even if the 
proper ground is not urged on appeal. Goodsel v. Dept. of Business Reg., 523 P.2d 1230, 
1232 (Utah 1974). 
In reviewing the District Court's findings of fact, this Court must assume that the 
record supports the findings since the Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence. 
Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, f 10, 94 P.3d 193. "To mount a successful 
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attack upon a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence 
in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." 
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, f 21, 54 P.3d 1177. 
Finally, any issue not raised in Appellant's main brief should not be considered by 
this Court on appeal. Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no statutes determinative of this appeal. The issues on this appeal are 
governed by Utah case law and Rules 52(a) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves a property boundary line dispute between the Helen W. Boyer 
Revocable Trust ("Helen Boyer") and Thomas Vern Boyer and Fewkes Canyon, LLC 
("Tom Boyer"). Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer own adjoining sections of property, with 
Helen Boyer owning section 31 and Tom Boyer owning section 32 of Township 3 North, 
Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. These property owners disputed the proper 
location of a fence line between the two sections of property. The dispute had been 
pending for many years, and most recently concerned a new fence erected by Tom Boyer. 
Helen Boyer claimed that the new fence had been installed inside the eastern boundary of 
Section 31, thereby encroaching upon her property. Helen Boyer filed this action against 
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Tom Boyer seeking an order requiring Tom Boyer to remove the new fence and install a 
fence on the line where an old 1977-78 fence was previously located. Helen Boyer 
further sought declaratory judgment, seeking an order declaring the rights of the 
adjoining property owners and establishing the common boundary line. 
By Second Amended Complaint, Helen Boyer joined Green as a defendant, 
alleging that Green negligently performed a survey of Section 32 for Tom Boyer, the 
adjoining property owner. The District Court granted Green's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ruling that Green owed no duty to Helen Boyer, an adjoining landowner, who 
did not contract for the survey services and did not rely upon the survey services. 
This matter went to trial between Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer, with the Court 
considering several past surveys that concerned the common boundary line. After trial of 
the evidence concerning the boundary line and the plaintiffs alleged damages, the 
District Court determined the boundary line between Section 31 and 32 and quieted title 
in each section to that boundary line. The Court further concluded that Helen Boyer had 
not proven damages as claimed, and rejected the testimony about damages. The Court 
ordered that the new fence erected by Tom Boyer be removed. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court 
Helen Boyer filed the original complaint in this action against Tom Boyer on June 
28, 2004. (R. 1.) A Second Amended Complaint was filed on August 4, 2005, naming 
Green as a defendant, and asserting a negligence claim against Green in count III of the 
Second Amended Complaint. (R.192, 197.) Green filed a Motion to Dismiss or 
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alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment on August 31, 2005. (R.203.) Upon 
completion of the briefing on Green's motion, a hearing was held on the motion on 
February 6, 2006. (R.283.) The Court granted Green's Motion for Summary Judgment 
by Ruling and Order dated February 7, 2006. (R.284-299; Addendum Exhibit 2.) 
The case went to trial between Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer on September 27-29, 
2006. By Memorandum Decision of the Court dated October 4, 2006, the Court quieted 
titled in the disputed property and ordered the newly erected fence to be moved to match 
the property line determined by the Court. (R.593-619.) The Court denied Helen 
Boyer's claim for damages, finding that the damages were not proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence. (R.626.) The final order and judgment of the Court was entered on 
December 11, 2006. (R. 625.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Helen Boyer's statement of facts primarily sets forth the findings of fact entered 
by the District Court following trial. Green does not dispute the findings of fact that are 
accurately recited from the trial court's memorandum decision, and the trial court's 
findings of fact provide background and much information concerning the claims 
between Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer. However, a more limited statement of facts is 
material to Helen Boyer's claim against Green. These facts are as follows: 
1. Helen Boyer is the record title owner of Section 31, Township 3 North, 
Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("Section 31"). (R.193, 596.) 
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2. Tom Boyer is the record title owner of Section 32, Township 3 North, 
Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("Section 32"). (R. 194.) 
3. Green surveyed the boundary of Section 32 for Tom Boyer at the request of 
Tom Boyer. (R. 206-7, Exhibit A - Affidavit of Dannie Green.) 
4. In connection with Green's survey of the property for Tom Boyer, Green 
filed a survey plat with the Summit County surveyor's office. He did not file any survey 
or any other documents with Summit County other than the survey documents filed with 
the Summit County surveyor's office under Title 17, Chapter 23 of the Utah Code. (R. 
206-7, Exhibit A - Affidavit of Dannie Green.) 
5. Count III of the plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint asserted a claim 
against Green based upon negligence. Specifically, Helen Boyer asserted that Green's 
actions in connection with his survey were carried out negligently and unprofessionally. 
(R. 197.) 
6. At trial, the District Court heard and considered testimony from numerous 
witnesses concerning the boundary line between Sections 31 and 32, and specifically 
concerning a common corner at the north edge of the properties. (R. 605.) The Court 
heard and considered the testimony of various surveyors concerning surveys of the 
property in question. (R. 603; R. 636 pp. 144-236, 250-292, 338-380; R. 637 pp. 488, 
602-610.) 
7. After considering the evidence at trial, the District Court did not agree with 
the line determined by Green's survey but concluded that "the process he engaged in was 
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not so flawed as to be without some merit and it was certainly not willfully incorrect. 
The Green survey was not done outside the standards of the profession, it is merely found 
to be incorrect based on the key finding that the government monument was not 
sufficiently recognized or weighed by Green." (R. 613; and Appellant's Addendum.) 
8. In installing the 2003 fence, Tom Boyer pushed a fence line to allow access 
to the presumed boundary line. Helen Boyer claimed that her property had been 
damaged by this pushed line. Tom Boyer introduced recent photographs of the area 
which showed that in the months between the installation of the fence in 2003 and the 
time of trial, the natural vegetation had largely already grown back over the area where 
the access road had been. (R.637, pp.628-29.) 
9. After trial, the District Court found the following as to the evidence 
presented by Helen Boyer on damages: 
19. The evidence presented by plaintiff as to damages was not 
persuasive. The cost to resurvey was not shown, and based on plaintiffs 
position the Court cannot see why another survey would have been helpful 
or would now be helpful. The evidence as to the cost to tear down the 2003 
fence was some indication of damages, but the cost to erect a range fence 
was not compelling such that the Court can find those costs are any 
measure of damages. It was not shown why any new clearing must take 
place, as when the 1977-78 fence was taken down in 2003, there still 
remains, as shown by photographs, an area somewhat clear where a new 
fence could be erected. That 1977-78 fence line is not overgrown such that 
any estimate concerning clearing it again would be accurate. The bids to 
again "clear" that already reasonably clear area are found not to be realistic. 
As to the alleged damages for remediation, as to planting new aspen trees 
or other vegetation, the evidence was not compelling just what was 
removed when the 2003 fence was erected. Certainly some trees were 
moved, but there was no sufficient evidence as to how many nor the value 
of those. Moreover, it was not shown why indeed concerning this range 
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land there needs to be any remediation as evidently over the many years 
this land has been in the Boyer family there has never been any such 
reforesting or replanting of grasses. The damages must be proven, though 
of course they need not be with specificity. They may not be the subject of 
conjecture, and the Court believes the estimates provided are just that -
conjecture. The costs for halting erosion or the spread of weeds appears to 
be the subject of government regulation, but it was not shown that moving 
the 2003 fence back to the 1977-78 fence location would cause any erosion 
or weed problems that must be budgeted for ten years. Moreover, this 
being range land it is not clear to the Court that any such costs are 
legitimate in any fashion. (R. 607-8; and Appellant's Addendum.) 
10. The fence, which was the subject of the boundary line dispute between 
Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer, and which the District Court ordered to be removed, has 
now been removed by Tom Boyer. (See Tom Boyer's Suggestion of Mootness, filed with 
this Court on July 11, 2007.) 
11. Following the District Court's declaratory judgment declaring the common 
boundary line and quieting title to the properties, Green filed an affidavit with the 
Summit County Surveyor's office attaching the District Court's Memorandum Decision 
so that the declaration of the common boundary by the District Court was made part of 
the record of survey. (See certified copy of Affidavit of Dannie B. Green, on file with the 
Summit County Surveyor as survey no. S0006440, attached as Addendum Exhibit 1.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case involves a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners, Helen 
Boyer and Tom Boyer. Green conducted a survey for Tom Boyer that concerned the 
subject boundary line. Helen Boyer disputed the surveyed property line and sued Tom 
Boyer for a judicial determination of the disputed line. Helen Boyer also attempted to 
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sue Green, contending that Green's survey was performed negligently. Helen Boyer 
never used or relied upon the survey, but simply disputed the accuracy of the survey. 
Several courts have analyzed negligence claims asserted by a landowner against a 
surveyor hired by an adjoining landowner, where there was no contractual privity and 
where the claimant had not relied upon the survey. These cases have determined that the 
non-reliant third party has no cause of action based on negligence against the surveyor. 
The cases essentially reason that absent reliance, a claim for negligent misrepresentation 
fails. 
The Utah case ofBushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1976) has similarly 
indicated that a property owner in Helen Boyer's position has no cause of action against 
the surveyor hired by another property owner, as she was not within the class of persons 
for whose guidance the information was supplied. 
Helen Boyer's remedy in the instant matter was to seek a declaratory judgment 
determining the boundary line and quieting title. Her claim against Tom Boyer sought 
just that, and the District Court determined the boundary line and quieted title to that line. 
The case law relied upon by Helen Boyer does not provide her with a cause of 
action against Green. The cases generally involved circumstances where a person was 
damaged by their reasonable reliance upon the survey. Accordingly, unlike the present 
case, the requisite elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation were 
present in the cases relied upon by Helen Boyer. 
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The public policy reasons urged by Helen Boyer also fail to support her cause of 
action in this case. The District Court correctly determined that where there are 
competing surveys and the court is called upon to determine the appropriate boundary 
line, public policy does not require a cause of action in negligence against each of the 
surveyors involved by each of the property owners. Indeed, public policy suggests the 
opposite result under the circumstances of this case. Where the elements of a negligent 
misrepresentation claim do not exist, the plaintiffs remedy should lie with the 
declaratory judgment fixing the boundary and quieting title. 
Subsequent to the dismissal of Green, this case went to trial between Helen Boyer 
and Tom Boyer to determine the boundary line. As part of the evidence at trial, Helen 
Boyer presented testimony from her own expert surveyors and also called Green as a 
witness. Helen Boyer maintained her contention that Green's survey was in error and 
that it was performed unprofessionally. In ruling on this issue, the District Court 
disagreed with the result of Green's survey, but determined that Green's survey was not 
done outside the standards of the survey profession. This determination by the District 
Court operates to preclude, by the issue preclusion branch of res judicata or by the law of 
the case doctrine, relitigation of the issue of Green's performance of the survey even if it 
is determined on this appeal that some basis could exist for Helen Boyer's negligence 
claim against Green. Helen Boyer contended that Green's survey was unprofessionally 
done, and the District Court determined the issue against her after a trial of the facts. The 
District Court's determination of this issue should be upheld on appeal as it involved 
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findings of fact, which are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous. 
Moreover, Helen Boyer, as the appellant, has failed to marshal the evidence in favor of 
the court's determination, and the court's ruling should be upheld on that basis. 
At trial, Helen Boyer failed to prove damages. The District Court ordered that the 
fence be moved, and Tom Boyer has now moved the fence in accordance with the order. 
The court otherwise found the alleged damages to be speculative and unsupported. This 
finding as to damages should be upheld on appeal as the evidence showed that Helen 
Boyer had sustained no damages. The great weight of the evidence is certainly not 
contrary to that finding, but indeed supports the finding, and Helen Boyer has failed to 
marshal the evidence on the issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HELEN BOYER HAD NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
GREEN, AND DID NOT USE OR RELY UPON GREEN'S SURVEY. AS A 
NON-RELIANT THIRD PARTY WITH NO CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONSHIP, HELEN BOYER'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST 
GREEN FAILS. 
Green performed his survey work at the request of Tom Boyer, and Green's duties 
accordingly ran toward Tom Boyer. Green had no contractual relationship with Helen 
Boyer, and owed no independent duty to Helen Boyer. In order to prevail on a 
negligence claim under Utah law, a plaintiff must establish, among other things, that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. Absent a showing that the defendant owed 
any duty, the claim of negligence has no merit. See Young v. Salt Lake City School 
District, 2002 UT 64, f 12, 52 P.3d 1230. The question of whether a duty exists is a 
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question of law to be determined by the Court and a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim is properly granted where the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. Ramsey v. 
Hancock, 2003 UT App 319, HI 8, 20, 79 P.3d 423. 
Several cases around the country have analyzed negligence claims brought by 
landowners against surveyors hired by adjoining landowners, and have held that the 
surveyors owed no duty to the landowner lacking contractual privity, and that claims of 
negligence and negligent misrepresentation failed for a lack of duty and a lack of 
reliance. In DeCapua v. Lambacher, 663 N.E. 2d 972 (Ohio App. 1995), a property 
owner brought an action for negligent misrepresentation against a surveyor hired by a 
neighboring property owner to establish the boundary line between the neighboring 
properties. The Court acknowledged that Ohio had recognized the doctrine of negligent 
misrepresentation as stated in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The 
Court held, however, that the duty acknowledged by section 552 does not extend to 
persons who do not rely upon the information, and hence does not extend to adjoining 
property owners who dispute the survey conducted. See DeCapua at 974. 
In Gipson v. Slagle, 820 S.W. 2d 595 (Mo. App. 1991), the Missouri Court of 
Appeals similarly held that a surveyor hired by a landowner owed no duty of care to 
adjoining landowners. In Gipson, Mijal and the Gipsons were abutting property owners. 
Mijal hired a surveyor, Slagle, to perform a survey of the west boundary line of MijaPs 
property, which was a common boundary between Mijal's property and Gipson's 
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property. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs 
negligence claims against the surveyor, stating: 
Here, as in Baublit, the Gipsons failed to show that the surveyor owed a 
duty of care to them or that they had relied upon the survey. The survey at 
issue was prepared by Slagle on behalf of the Mijals and there was no 
allegation of any action taken by the Gipsons in reliance upon the survey. 
In fact, the Gipsons disputed the boundary line established by the survey, 
rather than relied upon it. 
Gipson, at 598. 
Other cases around the country analyzing similar situations involving claims by 
landowners against surveyors, where the surveyor was hired by an adjoining landowner, 
have determined that the surveyor owed no duty to the adjoining landowner. See, e.g., 
Lindey's, Inc. v. Goodover, 872 P.2d 764 (Mont. 1994). Goodover hired surveyor Greg 
Martinsen to locate the boundary between Goodover's and Lindey's property, and 
plaintiff Lindey's hired a different surveyor. Lindey's filed suit alleging that Martinsen 
was negligent, and contended that Martinsen had a general duty to anyone affected by his 
survey. Lindey's also argued that Martinsen was negligent because he had an ongoing 
duty to change a survey if it was in error. The Montana Supreme Court concluded that 
Lindey's "failed to sustain its burden to show that an issue of material fact exists or that 
Martinsen owed it a legal duty. If no duty exists, there can be no tort of negligence." See 
Lindey 's, at 767. See also, Carlotta v. T. R. Stark & Associates, Inc., 470 A.2d 838, 840 
(Md. App. 1984), ("a surveyor of a disputed boundary line does not owe a duty of care to 
a non-reliant third party adjacent landowner.") 
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The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed this issue and has indicated that a 
surveyor hired by one landowner owes no duty to the adjoining landowners. In Bushnell 
v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court determined that a 
surveyor hired by one landowner owes no duty to the adjoining landowners. Appellant 
Helen Boyer relies upon certain language in Bushnell quoted from an A.L.R. annotated 
article, but misreads the law actually recognized and established by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Bushnell. Bushnell states, in no uncertain terms, that a party in Helen Boyer's 
position has no claim against the surveyor hired by an adjoining landowner. In Bushnell, 
plaintiff Bushnell brought an action against a neighboring property owner, Sillitoe, 
alleging encroachment. Bushnell joined the builder of the Sillitoes' home, who had 
constructed the home and sold it to the Sillitoes. Bushnell also joined Sandberg 
Engineers, who had surveyed the property for the builder. The builder filed a cross-claim 
against Sandberg, alleging that it had employed Sandberg to survey and stake the 
boundaries. A stipulation was entered in the case, whereby Bushnell's action was 
dismissed, and only the cross-claim by Sillitoes against the builder and Sandberg 
remained. The issue before the Supreme Court actually involved an issue of contribution 
between the builder and the surveyor. In ruling upon this issue, the Court stated that 
"Sandberg [the surveyor] owed no duty to the adjoining landowners, the Bushnells." 
Bushnell, at 1285. After reciting the case of Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E. 2d 656 (111. 
1969), the Court in Bushnell again reiterated that: 
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In the instant matter, Bushnells are not within the class of persons for 
whose guidance the information was supplied by Sandberg. Thus, Sandberg 
could not be held liable to Bushnells. 
Id. at 1286. (Emphasis added.) 
The above determination by the Utah Supreme Court in Bushnell demonstrates 
that Helen Boyer does not have a cause of action against Green in the instant matter, 
where Green performed his survey work for Tom Boyer, an adjoining landowner. Helen 
Boyer had no contractual relationship with Green, and Green therefore owed no 
contractual duties to Helen Boyer. As to any alleged tort duty, Helen Boyer was not 
within the class of persons for whose guidance the survey was supplied by Green, and 
Green therefore could not be held liable to Helen Boyer, as indicated by the Supreme 
Court in Bushnell Furthermore, Helen Boyer did not rely upon or use Green's survey in 
any way, but instead contested the survey, and therefore could not maintain a cause of 
action under section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, having not relied upon the 
survey. The District Court therefore correctly concluded that Helen Boyer could not 
maintain a negligence claim against Green. 
Helen Boyer argues on appeal that her property was encumbered by Green's 
survey, that Green refused to amend or otherwise correct the alleged inaccuracies, and 
that the District Court's ruling in favor of Green precluded her from seeking any 
meaningful redress. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 22.) To the contrary, Helen Boyer had a 
remedy and pursued her remedy against the adjoining property owner, Tom Boyer. As 
the District Court ruled in deciding Green's motion for summary judgment, where there 
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are competing surveys in the case and the court is called upon to determine the proper 
boundary and quiet title to the properties, the declaratory judgment claim provided the 
plaintiff with a remedy. (See District Court's Ruling and Order, dated February 7, 2006, 
pp. 11-13, R. 294-296; Addendum Exhibit 2.) At trial, the District Court did just that -
determined the boundary and quieted title in the properties. 
Following the District Court's declaratory judgment, Green filed an affidavit with 
the record of survey in the Summit County Surveyor's Office, attaching the District 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order and Judgment, which judicially determined 
the boundary line. See Affidavit of Dannie B. Green, filed with the Summit County 
Recorder, designated as depositor for survey plats in compliance with Section 17-23-17, 
Utah Code, Addendum Exhibit 1. (A certified copy of the Affidavit as filed with the 
Summit County Surveyor is attached as Addendum Exhibit 1.) 
Green urges this Court to take judicial notice of the Affidavit of Dannie B. Green 
filed with the Summit County Surveyor. While the taking of judicial notice on appeal is 
discretionary and will be taken only where there is a compelling countervailing principle 
to be served, Green submits that the exercise of such discretion would be appropriate 
here. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah App. 1994). Pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Evidence 201(b), the filing of the affidavit is a fact that is not subject to 
reasonable dispute and is capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Green submits that taking 
judicial notice of the filing of the affidavit does not run contrary to procedural policy that 
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prohibits a party from raising issues on appeal that were not raised below, since the fact is 
not one that could have been raised in the court below. The affidavit was filed with the 
Summit County record of survey following the District Court's final order and judgment 
declaring the boundary line so that the District Court's determination of the boundary 
could be accurately set forth and made a part of the survey records affecting the subject 
properties. 
As shown by Appellee Tom Boyer, the fence has been moved to the boundary line 
established by the declaratory judgment, as ordered by the District Court. (See Appellee 
Tom Boyer's Suggestion of Mootness, on file with this appeal, and Appellee Tom 
Boyer's Brief, p.2.) The District Court granted the declaratory relief sought by Helen 
Boyer. The common boundary line was determined by the District Court, title was 
quieted, the record of survey in Summit County reflects the District Court's 
determination of the boundary line, and the fence has been moved in accordance with the 
court's order. Helen Boyer has thus obtained her appropriate remedy. 
Appellant Helen Boyer's negligence claim against Green fails as Green did not 
owe Helen Boyer a duty as an adjoining property owner. Helen Boyer did not rely upon 
Green's survey, but instead relied upon other surveys. As a non-reliant third party, Helen 
Boyer had no claim against Green according to the law set forth by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Bushnell v. Sillitoe, and recognized by other courts around the country. See, 
e.g., DeCapua v. Lambacher, 663 N.E.2d 972 (Ohio App. 1995; Gipson v. Single, 820 
17 
S.W.2d 595 (Mo. App. 1991); Lindey's Inc. v. Goodover, 872 P.2d 764 (Mont. 1994); 
and Carlotta v. T.R. Stark & Associates, Inc., 470 A.2d 838 (Md. App. 1984). 
II. THE CASES RELIED UPON BY HELEN BOYER DO NOT SUPPORT 
HER CLAIM AGAINST GREEN, AS SHE WAS A NON-RELIANT THIRD 
PARTY, HAVING NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GREEN. 
Helen Boyer first relies upon the Utah case of Bushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284 
(Utah 1976). As discussed, supra at p. 14, Helen Boyer misreads the Court's discussion 
and holding in Bushnell, and simply relies upon language recited from an A.L.R. article 
in Bushnell The Court in Bushnell stated that "Sandberg [the surveyor] owed no duty to 
the adjoining landowners, the Bushnells." Id. at 1285. The Court determined that the 
Bushnells were not within the class of persons for whose guidance the information was 
supplied by the surveyor, and that the surveyor could therefore not be held liable to the 
Bushnells in tort. Helen Boyer is similarly situated to the Bushnells, and Green cannot be 
held liable to Helen Boyer in the instant matter. 
Helen Boyer next relies upon the case of Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d 656 (111. 
1969). Helen Boyer's reliance on Rozny is also misplaced. The plaintiff in Rozny was 
the vendee of the person for whom the survey was made. Thus, the plaintiff in Rozny 
was in the chain of title to the property for which the survey was conducted, and was 
within the class of persons for whose guidance the survey information was supplied. 
Moreover, the court's holding in Rozny was based in part upon an express guarantee 
provided by the surveyor. Id. at 663. Rozny therefore does not support Helen Boyer's 
position in this case. 
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The case of Hutchinson v. Dubeau, 289 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. App. 1982) also fails to 
support Helen Boyer's claim against Green. In Hutchinson, a Georgia statute imposed 
liability on the defendants so long as the plaintiff relied upon the survey. Hutchinson is 
therefore based upon a Georgia statute, which does not govern here. Moreover, the 
surveyor, Dubeau, was employed to prepare the plat for the plaintiffs predecessor in title, 
who subsequently sold the land to the plaintiff. Hutchinson stands for the proposition 
that a surveyor may be liable to third persons with whom he has no privity for negligent 
misrepresentation where the surveyor knew or should have known that such third persons 
would use or rely upon the plat in subsequent transactions involving the property. In 
dicta, the court in Hutchinson recognized that certain authority existed for holding a 
surveyor liable to third parties for negligent misrepresentations "provided that the 
surveyor knew or should have known that such third persons would use and rely upon the 
plat in subsequent transactions involving the property." Id. at 5. (Emphasis added.) 
Here again, Helen Boyer in the instant matter was not within the class of persons for 
whose guidance the Green survey was supplied, and Helen Boyer did not rely upon or use 
the Green survey. Hutchinson fails to support Helen Boyer's claim. 
Helen Boyer's reliance upon Kent v. Bartlett, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Cal. App. 1975) 
and Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) is similarly misplaced. In Kent, the 
plaintiff again was in the chain of title, having purchased the property in question from 
the person who had hired the surveyor. The Court held that the absence of privity of 
contract between the parties did not preclude the plaintiffs claim of negligence against 
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the surveyor, reasoning that the surveyor "could reasonably anticipate that it would be 
used and relied upon by persons such as plaintiffs, who purchased the property surveyed 
by defendant." Id. at 619. Again, the necessary element of reliance is lacking in the 
instant matter. 
Biakanja involved a negligence claim for the preparation of a will by a person who 
was determined to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The California Court 
held that such conduct should be discouraged and determined that the beneficiary of the 
will would have a cause of action against the drafter of the will. The factors analyzed by 
the California Court in Biakanja are not governing here. Nevertheless, the public policy 
factors analyzed in Biakanja would not lead to a cause of action against Green in the 
instant case. In ruling on Green's motion for summary judgment, the District Court ruled 
as follows: 
. . . The court, as a matter of public policy, determines there is not a duty 
owed by a surveyor such that a tort of negligence will lie whenever a 
property owner claims the survey is incorrect under circumstances such as 
this case. If any adjoining property owner could claim negligence against a 
surveyor who disagrees with other surveyors, there would be no reason 
whatever that defendant [Tom] Boyer could not file a negligence claim 
against Kent Wilde or others who performed a previous survey. 
* * * 
However, on balance, as a matter of public policy, where there [sic] 
allegations in this second amended complaint that will allow the court to 
determine the "correctness" of the various surveys that have been 
performed, plaintiff is not without a remedy. She is without a remedy 
against Green, or any other surveyor whose product disagrees with the 
product of other surveyors, but she is not without a remedy. 
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If the courts were to allow, under the circumstances of this case, 
such a negligence claim to stand, defendant Boyer could file a negligence 
claim against any and all other surveyors who disagreed with the survey he 
commissioned, claiming they were negligently performed and contain 
incorrect information which over the years has caused damage to Boyer, as 
"taking" his property and being an improper encumbrance on his property. 
In this case, each surveyor will presumably testify, and the court will 
make findings as to the "correct" boundary line, and issue declaratory 
judgment as to whether the boundary is where Green says it is or whether it 
is somewhere else, where other surveyors say it is. That does not mean that 
each surveyor should be liable if their work is incorrect, especially in this 
situation where there are remedies to find the "correct" boundary. 
Allowing negligence suits in such situations as this would create havoc. 
. . . Here, where there are competing surveys over a boundary line, there is 
no duty of a surveyor that is owed to one such as plaintiff, an adjoining 
property owner. 
(District Court's Ruling and Order, dated February 7, 2006, R. 292-295; and Addendum 
Exhibit 2.) 
In this case, Helen Boyer did not use or rely upon Green's survey, just as Tom 
Boyer did not use or rely upon other surveys. The District Court correctly concluded that 
negligence claims by adjoining, non-reliant, property owners should not be permitted 
under the circumstances of this case. To allow such claims could indeed result in a "free-
for-all" of negligence claims against surveyors retained by adjoining property owners 
attempting to establish their property rights. Under different circumstances, such as those 
where the requisite elements for a claim of negligent misrepresentation are present, a 
different result may be warranted. Here, however, the elements for negligent 
misrepresentation do not exist. 
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The cases relied upon by Helen Boyer primarily address situations where the party 
making the claim against the surveyor purchased the property in question from the 
landowner who hired the surveyor. The plaintiffs in those cases relied directly upon the 
survey and a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation was acknowledged despite 
the lack of direct contractual privity. Those cases do not provide Helen Boyer with a 
cause of action against Green in the instant matter. Helen Boyer did not rely upon 
Green's survey, and in fact, contested the survey. Helen Boyer's status in the instant 
matter is therefore much like the plaintiffs' status in the cases of DeCapua v. Lambacher, 
663 N.E.2d 972 (Ohio App. 1995), Gipson v. Slagle, 820 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. App. 1991), 
and Lindey's, Inc. v. Goodover, 872 P.2d 764 (Mont. 1994), which hold that a non-reliant 
third party has no cause of action against the surveyor hired by an adjoining landowner. 
The single Utah case that has examined this issue, Bushnell v. Sillitoe, has similarly 
stated that a surveyor hired by one landowner owes no duty to the adjoining landowners. 
The case of West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, 139 P.3d 1059 does 
not lead to a different result. West held that a real estate appraiser, like other real estate 
professionals, has an independent duty to non-contracting parties who rely upon the work 
of the appraiser. This Court in West cited prior Utah Supreme Court cases where the 
Supreme Court had "under certain circumstances recognized that economic losses are 
recoverable in tort under section 552 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts]." West, at 
If 13, quoting SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assoc, Inc., 2001 
UT 54, 28 P.3d 669. "For example, in Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & 
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Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986), the supreme court held that the plaintiff was not 
barred from pursuing its negligent misrepresentation action against a defendant surveyor 
even though the party was not in privity of contract." Id. In Price-Orem, the surveyor 
had surveyed and staked buildings for a shopping center being developed by Price-Orem 
Investment. The surveyor's contract was with the general contractor, John Price 
Associates. The Supreme Court upheld Price-Orem Investment's cause of action for 
negligent misrepresentation against the surveyor despite the lack of contractual privity. 
The court specifically recognized the viability of a cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation against the surveyor, indicating that both John Price Associates and 
Price-Orem Investment "were entitled to reasonably rely upon the information provided 
by [the surveyor]. And Price-Orem, as the owner of the property for whose benefit the 
shopping center was being constructed, was clearly a party whose justifiable reliance 
upon the accuracy of the survey might be reasonably foreseen." Price-Orem, at p. 59-60. 
Importantly, the tort cause of action recognized was one of negligent misrepresentation. 
The developer was within the group of persons for whose benefit the survey was 
performed and the developer reasonably relied upon the survey. 
In West, this Court recognized that under section 552 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, a real estate appraiser "is liable to 'a limited group of persons for whose benefit 
and guidance he [or she] intended to supply' the information if it justifiably relied on it." 
West, at f 27. Unlike the circumstances in West and Price-Orem, Helen Boyer is not 
within the group of persons for whose benefit the Green survey was performed. 
23 
Moreover, Helen Boyer did not rely upon Green's survey. The circumstances here are far 
different in that Helen Boyer contested Green's survey and had other surveyors upon 
whom she relied. Helen Boyer does not have a claim for negligent misrepresentation 
against Green, just as Tom Boyer would not have a claim for negligent misrepresentation 
against surveyors hired by Helen Boyer. 
The law set forth in West should not apply to a non-reliant third party. Numerous 
decisions around the country have held that a non-reliant third party has no cause of 
action against a surveyor hired by an adjoining landowner. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
Bushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284, has also stated that a surveyor hired by one 
landowner owes no duty to the adjoining landowners. Green acknowledges that the law 
set forth in Price-Orem recognizes a negligent misrepresentation claim where the facts 
give rise to such a cause of action. However, where the claimant is not within the group 
of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied and where there is no 
reliance, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not viable. Bushnell v. Sillitoe governs 
the instant matter. As set forth in Bushnell, and other cases around the country, such as 
DeCapua v. Lambacher, Gipson v. Slagle, and Lindey 's v. Goodover dealing with claims 
against surveyors by non-reliant third parties, there is no duty owed to a non-reliant third 
party property owner. 
The cases relied upon by Helen Boyer do not govern or apply to this matter, and 
the claim against Green was accordingly properly dismissed by the District Court. 
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III. AFTER A TRIAL OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE ADJOINING 
LANDOWNERS, THE DISTRICT COURT DETERMINED THAT 
GREEN'S SURVEY WAS NOT OUTSIDE THE STANDARDS OF THE 
PROFESSION. 
After the dismissal of Helen Boyer's claim against Green, this case went to a 
bench trial before the Honorable Bruce Lubeck for three days. (R.635-637.) The Court 
considered the testimony of various surveyors who had performed surveys affecting both 
Section 31 and Section 32, owned by Helen Boyer and Tom Boyer, respectively. The 
Court heard and considered the testimony of Helen Boyer's two expert witness surveyors, 
John Stahl (R.637, pp. 488-539.), and Kent Wilde (R. 636, pp. 338-368.), and also heard 
and considered Green's testimony concerning the boundary line in question. (R.636, 
pp. 144-237; R. 637, pp.602-610.) Indeed, the court heard testimony about numerous 
surveys that concerned the common north corner of the properties. (R.637, p.539.) After 
considering all of the evidence, the Court made the following findings of fact pertinent to 
Green's performance of the survey work: 
16. . . . To the Court all surveyors who testified seemed to be sincere 
and capable. It is apparent that surveying is not "rocket science" in that 
there is only one correct answer, but there is some disagreement even 
amongst experienced surveyors. Various notes from the past may be 
interpreted differently,.... 
Green explained his procedures and the reasons for his results. . . . 
Green explained that he considered the previous surveys, but also what are 
called the topographic calls, the original field notes from the 1874 U.S. 
survey, the conveyance deeds, the 1967 topographic map, the acreage 
involved, as well as other factors. He concluded that the 1977-78 fence 
was not the boundary line but the boundary line is where the 2003 fence 
was erected by Tom Boyer after the Green survey. The original plat of 
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1874 shows Section 31 is "short" and consists of 623.6 acres and Section 
32 consists of 640 acres. 
* * * 
18. . . . The [original 1874 field] notes are found by the Court to be 
inaccurate as to distances and thus the corners which were established by 
following those notes as Green did were inaccurate. Often the distances 
were off as much as 500 feet, which would and does account for the 
discrepancy Green states he found. Because the field notes were incorrect 
as plaintiffs expert opined, Green's reliance on them caused his final 
conclusion to be incorrect. 
(District Court's Memorandum Decision, dated October 4, 2006, Findings of Fact nos. 
16, 18, R. 603-607.) 
Ultimately, based upon its findings of fact, the District Court agreed with other 
surveyors and disagreed with Green's survey, declaring the boundary between Section 31 
and Section 32 to be along the old fence line. While the District Court disagreed with 
Green's survey, the Court expressly determined that Green's survey was not done outside 
the standards of the profession. The Court's pertinent conclusions of law, based upon its 
findings of fact, are as follows: 
2. . . . There is certainly a conflict whether the stone was at a common 
boundary, but on balance the Court concludes it was. . . . When Green 
conducted his survey in 2003 he gave weight to that evidence of a stone 
being found and observed by others, but Green gave it insufficient weight 
in the Court's view. . . . While Green did consider those things, he 
considered other evidences as being more important, and to the Court that 
is the principal reason the Court rejects his survey as showing the true 
boundary. The Green survey was not nearly as faulty as plaintiff alleges, 
however. Green simply disagreed with others and gave insufficient weight 
to the government stone and evidence that supported the presence of that 
stone, and he gave increased weight to his own "retracing" efforts and 
relied too heavily on questionable field notes over the government stone. 
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. . . Green's survey, while the Court concludes it was not sufficiently based 
on clear and available evidence of a section corner monument, was not 
done in willful disregard of standard principles of surveying. It was merely 
wrong and based on other evidences Green felt more important than the 
government monument evidence. Indeed, survey principles do not call for 
a "blind" adherence to a government monument if that monument is too 
questionable according to all evidence. However, as the Court understands 
it, Green used the 1874 field notes and examined terrain and topography 
and naturally occurring signs. Certainly those would change to some extent 
in 130 years. The process Green followed is indeed not dissimilar to what 
the Court is now undertaking in this and any other case. An examination of 
all evidence is made and a conclusion is reached. Green did that though in 
a way that others did not agree with and that this Court does not agree with, 
in that the key evidence, the government stone, was not properly weighed 
by Green. This Court does not agree with Green's result, or conclusion, but 
the process he engaged in was not so flawed as to be without some merit 
and it was certainly not willfully incorrect. The Green survey was not done 
outside the standards of the profession, it is merely found to be incorrect 
based on the key finding that the government monument was not 
sufficiently recognized or weighed by Green. 
(District Court's Memorandum Decision, dated October 4, 2006, Conclusion of Law no. 
2, R. 610-613.) 
Based upon a trial of the evidence, the Court found and concluded that Green's 
survey work did not fall outside the standards in the survey profession, although the 
Court disagreed with the boundary line determined in Green's survey. This 
determination by the trial court came after hearing much testimony from several different 
surveyors concerning the disputed property line, and after hearing argument from Helen 
Boyer's counsel, contending that Green did not comply with standards in the profession. 
(R.637, pp. 651-657.) Having presented its evidence concerning Green's survey, and 
having contended that the survey was erroneous and performed unprofessionally, Helen 
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Boyer is bound by the District Court's determination that Green's survey did not fall 
below the standard of care in the surveying industry. Thus, even assuming some duty 
owed to Helen Boyer by Green, Green would not be liable to Helen Boyer, by virtue of 
the law of the case doctrine or the issue preclusion branch of res judicata, as the District 
Court has determined that Green's survey complied with the standards in the survey 
profession. The "law of the case" doctrine provides that a decision made on an issue 
during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same case. Thurston v. 
Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). Under one branch of the doctrine, 
a court is justified in refusing to reconsider matters resolved in a prior ruling in the same 
case for reasons of efficiency and consistency. Id. at 1038. Under issue preclusion, the 
relitigation of factual issues that have once been litigated and decided is precluded even if 
a different claim for relief is brought, and even if only "the party against whom the 
doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication." 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah App. 1988), quoting 
Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah App. 1987). 
Applied to the instant matter, the law of the case doctrine or issue preclusion 
should preclude Helen Boyer from relitigating the issue of Green's conduct in performing 
his survey for Tom Boyer. Although Green was not a party to the case at the time of 
trial, nothing prevented Helen Boyer from putting on evidence concerning Green's 
survey or the basis for Green's survey, and Helen Boyer in fact called Green as a witness 
during her case in chief. She also presented testimony from her two surveyor experts, 
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John Stahl and Kent Wilde, contending that Green's survey was in error. (R. 636, pp. 
338-368; R. 637, pp. 488-539, 641-644.) The District Court fully considered Green's 
performance of the survey for Tom Boyer, and made findings and conclusions regarding 
Green's performance. Helen Boyer is precluded from relitigating this issue. 
Accordingly, the District Court's ruling dismissing Helen Boyer's claim against Green 
should be affirmed even if some theoretical basis exists for a cause of action against 
Green in favor of Helen Boyer, as the District Court found after a trial of the issues that 
the survey conducted by Green was not outside the standards in the survey profession. 
The District Court's determination of this issue was based upon its findings of fact 
at trial, which should not be disturbed unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. 
Johnson v. Higley, supra. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. 
Proc. 52(a). "The trial court is not required to recite each indicia of reasoning that leads 
to its conclusion, nor is it required to marshal the evidence in support of them." In re 
Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996). Although the trial court need not 
marshal the evidence to support its findings, the appellant must marshal the evidence if it 
seeks to overturn the trial court's findings. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 
2002 UT 94, f 21, 54 P.3d 1177. Because Appellant Helen Boyer has failed to marshal 
the evidence on this issue, the findings have not been properly challenged on appeal and 
the findings must be upheld. 
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IV. HELEN BOYER FAILED TO PROVE ANY DAMAGES, AND IS 
PRECLUDED BY THE LAW OF THE CASE OR BY THE DOCTRINE OF 
ISSUE PRECLUSION FROM RELITIGATING THE ISSUE OF 
DAMAGES. 
After considering the evidence on damages offered by Helen Boyer at trial, the 
District Court determined that no damages had been proven. Indeed, there were no 
damages sustained, and the declaratory judgment fixing the boundary line and quieting 
title provided Helen Boyer with the necessary remedy. The fence was then moved by 
Tom Boyer and there is nothing further to remedy. In its finding of fact no. 19, the 
District Court found as follows: 
19. The evidence presented by plaintiff as to damages was not 
persuasive. . . . As to the alleged damages for remediation, as to planting 
new aspen trees or other vegetation, the evidence was not compelling just 
what was removed when the 2003 fence was erected. Certainly some trees 
were moved, but there was no sufficient evidence as to how many nor the 
value of those. Moreover, it was not shown why indeed concerning this 
range land there needs to be any remediation as evidently over the many 
years this land has been in the Boyer family there has never been any such 
reforesting or replanting of grasses. The damages must be proven, though 
of course they need not be with specificity. They may not be the subject of 
conjecture, and the Court believes the estimates provided are just that -
conjecture. 
(District Court's Memorandum Decision, dated October 4, 2006, Finding of Fact 
no. 19, R. 607, 608.) (Emphasis added.) In Conclusion of Law No. 5, the District Court 
stated: 
5. Plaintiff has not proven damages as claimed. The cost of removing 
the fence erected in 2003 was not shown convincingly, nor was any need 
for remediation shown convincingly. The evidence presented was too 
speculative and not based on sufficient foundation such that it convinces 
the Court that there needs to be any erosion or weed control, or that a range 
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fence or any other fence would cost anywhere near what the plaintiffs 
evidence showed. The Court rejects all the testimony about damages and 
concludes that plaintiff has not proven any damages resulting from the 
removal of the 1977-78 fence or the erection of the 2003 fence. 
(District Court's Memorandum Decision, dated October 4, 2006, Conclusion of Law no. 
5, R. 615,616.) 
Having made the factual finding that the plaintiffs evidence on damages was 
based upon conjecture, and having determined that the evidence was too speculative, the 
District Court's decision precludes Helen Boyer from relitigating the issue of damages by 
the law of the case and/or the issue preclusion doctrines. As set forth, supra, the 
doctrines of law of the case and/or issue preclusion preclude the relitigation of these 
issues by Helen Boyer. Thus, even assuming a potentially viable cause of action by 
Helen Boyer against Green, Helen Boyer failed to prove any damages in the trial between 
the Boyer parties, and is bound by the factual findings as to damages. Without damages, 
any potential claim of negligence against Green fails as a matter of law. 
Following entry of the District Court's final order and judgment, Tom Boyer 
removed the encroaching fence as ordered by the court, and the fence has been placed 
along the line declared in the order and judgment. {See Appellant's Brief, p. 24.) 
V. THE APPELLANT, HELEN BOYER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES. 
In the interest of brevity and to avoid duplication, Green hereby incorporates and 
adopts by reference the arguments and authorities contained in the brief of Appellees 
Tom Boyer and Fewkes Canyon, LLC on the issue of the Appellant's failure to marshal 
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the evidence on damages. The appellate court "does not review the trial court's factual 
findings where the party challenging those findings fails to marshal the evidence. 
Instead, the court of appeals must 'assume that the record supports the findings of the 
trial court.'" Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, f 10, 94 P.3d 193. As the 
Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence on damages, to show that the trial court's 
findings were clearly erroneous, the appeal from the trial court's decision on damages 
fails. The trial court's decision on the issues of damages should therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The negligence claim against Green fails, as Helen Boyer was a non-reliant third 
party and therefore cannot satisfy the elements required for negligent misrepresentation. 
Her remedy was to seek a declaratory judgment for a judicial determination of the 
disputed boundary, which is exactly what occurred in the District Court. At trial, the 
court determined that Green did not breach the standard of care in the surveying 
profession. The law of the case doctrine and/or issue preclusion prevent Helen Boyer 
from relitigating this issue. The determination is based upon findings supported by the 
evidence, which findings are not clearly erroneous and have not been properly challenged 
by the Appellant. 
Helen Boyer's asserted damages were found to be based upon conjecture. Indeed, 
there were no actual damages. The District Court's findings as to damages are supported 
by the evidence. They are not clearly erroneous, and were not challenged by Helen 
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Boyer by marshaling the evidence. Without damages, any theoretical negligence cause 
of action against Green further fails. 
The District Court properly granted Green summary judgment. Green requests 
that this Court affirm the District Court's order granting summary judgment to Green, 
and requests that this Court affirm the District Court's findings and conclusions with 
regard to Green's performance of the survey and affirm the findings and conclusions with 
regard to damages. 
DATED this Jl - day of October, 2007. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
^ 6 H N N. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorney for Appellee Dannie Green 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of this Brief of Appellee Dannie Green were 
served by U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, on this /<? ~ day of October, 2007 to 
the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Robert H. Wilde 
935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
/£J&£^ 
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ADDENDUM 
Certified copy of Affidavit of Dannie B. Green, on file with 
the Summit County Surveyor as survey no. S0006440 Exhibit 1 
District Court's Ruling and Order, dated February 7, 2006 Exhibit 2 
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\ ILL No §000 k> H^O 
FILED AT THE REQUEST OF: 
Plant n.Kr;<K+en*±v,<uKwe[/ 
FEE$ 7aJ0ft K^^g^faJ 
AFFIDAVIT OF DANNIE B. GREEN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF \ / V ^ W w , W ) 
Dannie B. Green, being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a licensed surveyor, licensed as such under the laws of the state of Utah. 
2. I performed a survey of Section 32, Township 3 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, which survey is dated September 24,2003, and was filed with the Summit County 
Surveyor's Office according to Utah Code Ann. §17-23-1 on or about December 10,2004, as 
Survey No. S-5664. 
3. I also performed a survey covering Sections 28,29,32, N lA 33, Lot 3 Middle Canyon 
Ranch, Township 3 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which survey is dated 
April 5,2001, and was filed with the Summit County Surveyor's Office according to Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-23-1 on or about July 11,2001, as Survey No> S-4041. 
4. The location of the common corner to sections 29,30, 31 and 32 of Township 3 North, 
Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and the boundary between Section 31 and Section 32 
were the subject of a civil lawsuit, Case No. 040500429, filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Summit County, State of Utah. The Court in that case entered a Memorandum 
Decision on October 4,2006 concerning the common corner and the boundary line between 
Sections 31 and 32. The Court's Decision states, in part, on page 21 of the Memorandum 
Decision: 
[T]he court concludes that the true boundary line between sections 31 and 32 at 
the north end of those sections is where it was shown on the Malan and 
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Christensen surveys, where Wilde and many others saw the government stone, 
where the 1977-78 fence was erected. The boundary line then proceeds southerly 
and westerly to the point at the south end of sections 31 and 32 which is not 
disputed and shown on all surveys, including Green's. That is the true boundary 
and title is quieted in each section to that boundary line. 
A true and complete copy of the Court's Memorandum Decision dated October 4,2006 is 
attached hereto. A copy of the Court's Order and Judgment signed by Judge Bruce C. Lubeck on 
December 8,2006 and filed with the clerk of the court on December 11,2006, is also attached 
hereto. 
DATED this /J^ day of March, 2007. 
Notary Public 
REED D. SCOW 
1576 West AQQ South 
Hurricane UT 84737 
My Commission Expires 
Novrmbrr27 2010 
State of Utah 
£/SL«^ /6 
Dannie B. Green 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this G .day of March, 2007. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public iNotary ruoiic i i j 
Residing at: HfiflrxM&C-r [A<^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTYr STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN W. BOYER, TRUSTEE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS VERN BOYER and FEWKES 
CANYON, LLC, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No, 040500429 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: October 4, 2006 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
September 27, 28 and 29, 2006. Plaintiff was present with Ray G. 
Martineau and Brett D. Cragun and defendants were present with 
and through Robert H, Wilde. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint June 26, 2004. A second amended 
complaint was filed August 4, 2005. 
The second amended complaint alleged plaintiff was the 
trustee of the L.E. and Helen W. Boyer Revocable Trust. It 
alleged in summary that plaintiff and her predecessors are title 
holders of Section 31, Township 3 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, according to an 1874 U.S. Survey. Defendants 
are legal title holders to Section 32. For more than twenty 
years the owners agreed that a common true boundary was marked by 
a fence erected in 1977 or 1978. In July 2003, defendant took out 
the recognized fenc;e ana erected a new fence inside the eastern 
" 10/06/2006 U:57 FAX @)003/027 
boundary of Section 31. 
The second amended complaint alleges (1) tortous (sic) 
misconduct by defendant Boyer, (2) seeks removal of the new fence 
and erection of the former fence, and in cause four (claim three 
against Green has been dismissed) seeks a declaratory judgment 
that the old fence was and is the true boundary line and (5) 
seeks punitive damages based on the wilful nature of the conduct. 
The court has made several rulings in the case. On February 
7, 2006, the court dismissed the case against defendant Greenr a 
surveyor hired by defendants, The claims against him were 
essentially that his 2003 survey, upon which defendants' relied 
in removing the old fence and erecting the new fence, was faulty 
and without foundation and in violation of survey standards. 
On July 26, 2006, the court denied the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment, ruling factual questions existed as 
to the boundary and the court reaffirmed the dismissal of Green. 
Thus, the issue in this case is the location of a common 
boundary between two sections, section 31 owned by plaintiff and 
section 32 owned by defendant Fewkes, formerly owned by defendant 
Tom Boyer. 
At the end of plaintiff's case defendants moved under Rule 
41(b) for a dismissal. The court reserved on the motion and 
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addresses it herein in these findings. 
The court beard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised* 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Joseph and Lois Boyer owned land in the Chalk Creek area 
of Summit County, near Coalville. What has happened to their 
land since their death is the subject of this dispute, Joseph 
died in 1967 and Lois died in 1971. They had several children: 
Joseph LaVern (Vern), Lyle, William, Leah Nielson, (the only 
daughter), Edison (Ted) and Fay Boyer, 
2. Tom Boyer, defendant, is the grandson of Joseph and Lois 
through Tom's father Vern, who is the brother of Lyle Boyer, the 
deceased spouse of plaintiff, 
3. Tom Boyer received section 32 and Lyle Boyer received 
section 31 through the chain of title to be described below. 
Just what those sections entailed and now entail is at issue in 
this case. 
4. On October 3, 2003, Tom Boyer sold section 32 to 
defendant Fewkes, a limited liability company, whose managing 
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member is Tom's son Jeremy Boyer. In November 2003 Fewkes 
conveyed approximately 6 acres to Jeremy Boyer. 
5. Plaintiff is the trustee of the Lyle and Helen Boyer 
Revocable Trust, and the wife of Lyle Boyer, now deceased, and 
thus the aunt of Tom Boyer. 
6. Plaintiff is the record title owner of section 31. Both 
sections 31 and 32 are in Township 3 North, Range 6 Bast, 5LBSM, 
U.S. Survey. 
7. Lyle Boyer acquired property through an executor's deed 
from the estate of his parents, Joseph and Lois Boyer- That deed 
was executed by one of the co-executors, William Boyer, another 
son of Joseph and Lois, on July 31, 1979, and that deed conveyed 
a good deal of other land and included ^Section 31, [listing 
township and range as above], U.S. Survey, containing 623,6 
acres, more or less/' subject to the probate decree mineral 
rights. Lyle Boyer then quit claimed that same property with the 
identical description as to section 31 on June 14, 1988, to the 
trust named as plaintiff herein. 
8. Tom Boyer acquired section 32 from his father Vern Boyer. 
Also on July 31, 1979, William Boyer as co-executor executed an 
executor's deed conveying property to Joseph LaVern Boyer, (Vern 
Boyer) and that included "Section 32 [naming the same township 
and range] containing 640 acres, more or less." It thus differs 
from the executor's deed concerning section 31 in that this 
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section 32 executor's deed did not use the words "U.S. Survey." 
It was also subject to mineral rights under the probate decree. 
Vern Boyer by quit claim deed conveyed the same property, 
including the same description as to Section 32, to Tom and Vern 
Boyer Land and Livestock,, a Utah partnership, on October 13, 
1982. The Tom and Vern Boyer Land and Livestock company executed 
a warranty deed on May 11, 1995, to Tom Boyer and his wife. That 
property consisted of, among other property, Section 32 with the 
same description as the deed by which it was acquired, Tom Boyer 
and his wife, by warranty deed executed October 7, 2003, conveyed 
"All of Section 32 [same range and township3 to Fewkes. That 
deed did not contain any note as to acreage. As noted Fewkes 
conveyed a few acres to Jeremy Boyer and is wife the next month 
in 2003. 
3* In the lifetime of Joseph and Lois Boyer sections 31 and 
32 were fenced around their perimeter, along with other sections 
not at issue in this case. However, there was no fence between 
sections 31 and 32 during the lives of Joseph and Lois. A fence 
was first erected between sections 31 and 32 in 1977 or 1978 as 
will be described below. 
10. Long ago, at a date not revealed by the testimony, but 
evidently not long after the deaths of Joseph and Lois, a dispute 
arose between Vern Boyer (and his son Tom Boyer) and Lyle Boyer 
concerning the boundary between section 31 and section 32. Tom 
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Boyer thus commissioned a licensed surveyor, Fred Malan, who did 
a survey in 1976. Malan conducted that work on August 7 and 14, 
1976. Tom Boyer accompanied Fred Malan on those two days, as did 
Malan's son Kent, who was assisting his father- Malan prepared a 
certified report a year later, in September 1977> That report 
indicated that Malan located a rock with markings on the north 
boundary of the line between sections 31 and 32. Section 32 lies 
east of section 31/ and north of section 31 is section 30 owned 
by Judd and north of section 32 and east of section 30 is section 
29. To the south of section 31 lies section 6 and to the south 
of section 32 and to the east of section 6 lies section 5, these 
sections 5 and 6 being in another township. Malan certified he 
made a survey of the line between sections 31 and 32, The rock 
was noted as having 5 notches on the east and one notch on the 
south. At one point the certification states the survey was done 
for Fay and Tom Boyer, and at another that it was done for Vernon 
Boyer, Tom Boyer and Fay Boyer. Between sections 29 and 30 there 
was a fence that was erected before any of these events. The 
stone Malan indicated he found was at the intersection between 
sections 31 and 32 where the fence between sections 30 and 29 
touched the northern edge of sections 31 and 32. The northern 
boundary of sections 31 and 32 was also fenced long before these 
events to separate the sections north of sections 31 and 32. 
11. Not long after the Malan survey, sometime in 1977 or 
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1987, Tom Boyer erected a fence between sections 31 and 32. It 
was called by Tom Boyer a "stock" fence and he stated it was only 
to keep out livestock, and he did not intend it to be the 
boundary as he did not believe that was the proper boundary. 
That fence corresponded with the Malan survey, and on the north 
boundary the fence began where the fence between sections 30 and 
29 ended on the south edge of those sections and the north edge 
of sections 31 and 32. There was thus a "four way" fence corner 
at the intersections of sections 29, 30, 31, and 32. The fence 
was approximately 400 feet east, into section 32, of where Tom 
Boyer believed and continues to believe the boundary between 
section 31 and 32 should be. The fence went south and westerly, 
and was erected by Tom Boyer. 
12. That Malan plat was recorded by Vern Boyer, who recorded 
it October 9, 1980, along with an affidavit from Vern Boyer which 
stated that Malan located the "corner section corner common to 
sections 31 and 32 . . .and sections 5 and 6 « . •" Attached was 
a copy of the Malan survey dated September 1977. 
13. Disputes still continued between Tom and Lyle Boyer as 
to the boundary. Tom Boyer commissioned another survey in 1985 
from Bing Christensen, also a licensed surveyor. Christensen did 
a survey June 4, 1985, and prepared a drawing showing the 
results, including stone monuments and fence corner posts he 
found and accepted as evidence of the location of corresponding 
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section corners. Christensen provided two affidavits to that 
effect, one in October of an unknown year and one in October 
2001. That map shows a stone was located at the XAfence corner" 
where sections 31 and 32 meet, on the north edge. What was 
labeled as a ^section corner stone" was found on the southwest 
corner of section 31 and another section corner stone was located 
at the southeast corner of section 32. A "fence comer" was 
labeled on the boundary of sections 31 and 32 at the south edge. 
14. Disputes continued and a meeting was held at the request 
of Tom Boyer at the Summit County Courthouse in Coalville in 
October 1985. Present were Tom Boyer, his lawyer Wendell 
Bennett, Lyle Boyer, Bing Christensen, Kent Wilde, Sam Lewis, who 
leased section 31 from plaintiff, and Ron Baxter. Baxter and 
Wilde were surveyors Lyle had hired in the past. The boundary 
between the sections was discussed and out of that meeting 
further confusion arose. Some claim there was an agreement and 
some claim there was not. The court finds that all agreed that 
the fence erected by Tom Boyer was the correct boundary line that 
everyone would live with. Correspondence between Bennett, 
representing Tom Boyer, and Lyle Boyer followed. Bennett stated 
to Lyle the temporary fence was 400 feet too far to the east 
(into section 32) at the north end and 50 feet too far east at 
the south end of section 32. Bennett enclosed the Christensen 
survey. Lyle Boyer responded that he had tried to locate the 
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section line between the two sections. Lyle referred to receiving 
the Malan survey and it showed the fence built by Tom Boyer was 
the true line, Lyle stated he believed the Christensen and Malan 
surveys both showed the fence put up by Tom Boyer in about 1977-
78 was in the right place, Lyle agreed to maintain the southern 
half and Tom would maintain the northern half of that fence, as 
Bennett had proposed. After the October 1985 meeting Bennett 
again wrote Lyle and stated concerning the fence Tom built in 
1977-78 that "we have now agreed to recognize as the boundary 
line between sections 31 and 32 until such a time as the 
government authority charged with the responsibility . . . re-
establishes those corner markers as between sections 31 and 32 . 
« . Until [a further government survey occurs) we agreed to honor 
the fence line as described in the enclose document, which was 
established by Bing Christensen . . [and which was agreed to by 
Kent Wilde.]" The Bennett letter attached a description that was 
based somewhat on the Christensen survey, but it did not exactly 
trace that map, but began at the southwest corner of section 31, 
then north along a fence, then east 5288 feet to the four-corner 
fence line made between sections 29, 30, 31, and 32. Lyle Boyer 
wrote back in early 1986 and stated the existing fence could stay 
where it was located and he would maintain the southern half and 
Tom the northern half. Bennett in June 1986 asked Lyle to sign 
the agreement and that was never done. From all of this the 
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court finds that there was an agreement but Tom Boyer was not 
happy or satisfied about it. No written agreement was ever 
executed and that agreement has no legal significance but informs 
the court as to credibility issues. 
15. Because of the continuing disagreement, Tom Boyer 
commissioned yet another survey, by Green or Alta Surveying, in 
2003. Green's survey, working for ALTA Survey, formed the basis 
of later action by Tom Boyer. Green's survey indicated the 
boundary between sections 31 and 32 was approximately 420 feet 
west, or into section 31, of where Malan and Chrlstensen had 
placed the northern boundary. That is, the fence running between 
sections 29 and 30, where it touched the northern boundary of 
sections 31 and 32, was incorrect, and the true boundary was west 
420 at the north end and about 50 west at the southern end. If 
the line was where Tom erected the fence in 1977 a spring at the 
southern end of the properties was partly in section 31 and 
partly in section 32. If the Green survey is correct, and the 
newly erected 2003 fence reflects the true boundary, that spring 
is entirely within section 32. Water rights are not at issue in 
this case. 
Based on the Green survey, Tom Boyer removed the fence he 
had erected in 1977-78 and erected a new fence along the line 
shown as the boundary by Green, that is, about 420 feet to the 
west, at the north end, of where the old fence was and about 50 
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the 187a U.S. Survey, the conveyance deeds, the 1967 topographic 
map, the acreage involved, as well as other factors. He 
concluded that the 1977-7B fence was not the boundary line but 
the boundary line is where the 2003 fence was erected by Tom 
Boyer after the Green survey. The original plat of 1874 shows 
section 31 is "short" and consists of 623.6 acres and section 32 
consists of 640 acres. 
Green had done another survey in the area, for a person 
named Henrie, in 2001. Henrie was interested in purchasing 
section 28 and some of section 33, and so Green obtained 
documents and information from neighboring land owners, including 
Tom Boyer, to conduct that survey. Green also obtained a title 
company title report which was suppose to contain the public 
documents. Later in 2003, after Tom Boyer heard of Green and his 
2001 survey, Tom Boyer asked Green to establish the boundary 
between sections 31 and 32. Green later concluded, after talking 
to some of the surveyors of plaintiff, that they were wrong and 
he was right. Green opined that plaintiffs surveyors had simply 
accepted the "stone" they found without "testing" it against 
other information, as Green did* Thus, Green opined as he did* 
Green filed a survey for Henrie, and it varies in some 
regards from the Tom Boyer survey of 2003, which was filed in 
2004 with the recorder. (There is no Summit County surveyor, so 
surveys are filed with the county recorder.) Green explained the 
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described the stone a bit differently but as being in the same 
location as the four corner fence area, where the 1977-78 fence 
was erected going south, Tom Boyer testified he did not see such 
a stone ever, nor did his son Jeremy. Tom went to the site with 
Malanr Christensen, and at other times. The court credits the 
testimony of Wilde and others more than Tom Boyer concerning this 
government stone and its location. The description of the stone 
convinces the court not that they are wrong, but that they are 
being honest. The court does not indicate or imply Tom Boyer 
caused the removal of the stone, but the court credits the 
testimony of the many persons who saw the stone at the point 
where the Malan and Christensen surveys indicate it was. That 
is, where the fence line coming from the north between sections 
29 and 30 joins the northern boundary of sections 31 and 32, or 
where the 1977-78 fence was erected by Tom Boyer. 
18. The court finds from its own common sense as well as the 
expert testimony elicited, that the field notes from 1874 were 
not completely accurate as to what are called the topographic 
calls. The topographic map shows, for example, a ridge or gulch 
or stream, and the field notes from 1874 indicate those were in 
different places from what the topographic map shows. The 
survey's field notes from 1874 would say, for example, that from 
point A it was "X chains (converted* into feet and inches) to a 
Mridge." Of course just where a ridge begins and ends is hard to 
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would be accurate. The bids to again "clear" that already 
reasonably clear area are found not to be realistic. As to the 
alleged damages for remediation, as to planting new aspen trees 
or other vegetation, the evidence was not compelling just what 
was removed when the 2003 fence was erected. Certainly some trees 
were moved, but there was no sufficient evidence as to how many 
nor the value of those. Moreover/ it was not shown why indeed 
concerning this range land there needs to be any remediation as 
evidently over the many years this land has been in the Boyer 
family there has never been any such reforesting or replanting of 
grasses. The damages must be proven, though of course they need 
not be with specificity. They may not be the subject of 
conjecture, and the court believes the estimates provided are 
just that-conjecture. The costs for halting erosion or the spread 
of weeds appears to be the subject of government regulation, but 
it was not shown that moving the 2003 fence back to the 1977-78 
fence location would cause any erosion or weed problems that must 
be budgeted for 10 years. Moreover, this being rangeland it is 
not clear to the court that any such costs are legitimate in any 
fashion. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
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weighed. The court has done just that. 
2. The court concludes that the government stone was 
observed before 1985 and in 1985. Its authenticity cannot 
reasonably be questioned. Defendant's evidence was the direct 
testimony of Tom Boyer that he had looked for a monument and had 
failed to find it/ spending perhaps 30 hours in so doing. The 
other witnesses for defendant, William Boyer through his 
deposition and a letter from Lyle Boyer, are found to be less 
convincing than the witnesses who testified they actually saw the 
stone. There is certainly a conflict whether the stone was at a 
common boundary, but on balance the court concludes it was. The 
testimony of Kent wilde is particularly telling and informative. 
While legally insignificant, Tom Boyer's testimony about an 
October 1985 meeting is some influence to the court. Several 
persons were there and presented testimony that after Tom Boyer 
erected the fence in 1977-78, he still disputed its position as 
being correct, so he a6ked for a meeting. Of all the people who 
attended, everyone including his attorney indicated there was an 
agreement that the fence would remain where Tom Boyer had erected 
it and the fence would be the boundary. There is certainly some 
language in the correspondence indicating some conflicts, but the 
court has found there was an agreement. Again, that is not of any 
legal significance as to the boundary but to the court it deals 
with credibility in that Tom Boyer then, many years later, 
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title report and Green failed to discover the 1985 Christensen 
survey which was of record and had been recorded by Vern Boyer in 
1980. Green had no reason to contact Kent Wilde as Wilde had not 
filed a survey of this area. Green did not but certainly should 
have contacted adjacent landowners including plaintiff, but Green 
did have, as noted, the field notes from the 1874 survey and his 
task was to retrace that survey* He had the topographic map from 
1967 and there was no stone shown on that map, nor was there a 
stone located at the site in 2003. Green did not file an 
amendment to the 2001 Henrie survey, but the later 2003 survey 
and the narratives involved make clear that in practical effect 
the 2003 survey was an amendment to the 2001 survey. Green thus 
did not completely fail to follow standard principals to any 
degree approaching plaintiffrs claims of wilfulness or 
professional incompetence. Green's survey, while the court 
concludes it was not sufficiently based on clear and available 
evidence of a section corner monument, was not done in wilful 
disregard of standard principles of surveying* It was merely 
wrong and based on other evidences Green felt more important than 
the government monument evidence. Indeed, survey principles do 
not call for a "blind" adherence to a government monument if that 
monument is too questionable according to all evidence. However, 
as the court understands it, Green used the 1874 field notes and 
examined terrain and topography and naturally occurring signs. 
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4- The conveyance deeds indeed were intended to convey 
certain properties to the heirs of Joseph and Lois Boyer, There 
were six children involved, including Vern and Lyle, five sons 
and one daughter. The court concludes, from all the evidence, 
that the conveyance deeds were not unambiguous and extrinsic 
evidence was thus allowed- The deeds were ambiguous because the 
deeds stated a specific legal description (section 31 or 32) PLUS 
an acreage amount. The deed to Lyle stated VS Survey. The deed 
to Vern did not. Those create an ambiguity. The court finds and 
concludes that the intent of Joseph and Lois is what the court 
must determine, as the co-executors were then to continue to 
execute that intent and convey what Joseph and Lois intended. 
From examining the probate documents in evidence, as well as the 
deposition of William Boyerf the executor who executed the deeds 
concerning these sections, and considering all the extrinsic 
evidence, the court concludes that it was the intent of Joseph 
and Lois Boyer, to convey section 31, whatever that section was 
according to the U.S. Survey, to Lyle Boyer. Similarly, it was 
the intent of Joseph and Lois Boyer to convey all of section 32/ 
whatever that was according to the U.S. Survey, to Vern Boyer. 
There was not any evidence that clearly and unequivocally shows 
an intent by Joseph and Lois Boyer to convey any set amount of 
land. These sections conveyed were only part of the land 
conveyed by the executor's deeds, which conveyed other property 
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any other fence would cost anywhere near what plaintiff's 
evidence showed. The court rejects all the testimony about 
damages and concludes that plaintiff has not proven any damages 
resulting from the removal of the 1977-78 fence or the erection 
of the 2003 fence. 
6. The claim of bad faith as to Green has been fully 
rejected. The claim of bad faith as to Tom Boyer is harder to 
resolve. Certainly Tom Boyer would argue that he acted, in 
taking down the 1977-78 fence and erecting the 2003 fence, that 
he acted on the basis of a legitimately commissioned survey. 
That is certainly true* However, the pause the court engages in 
is to ask itself why Tom Boyer felt any need to commission the 
2003 survey. He had asked Malan and Christensen to do a survey 
and they did so, each certifying the boundary line at a place 
where plaintiff claims it to be. He agreed to others that was 
the situation in the October 1985 meeting- He still could not 
seem to leave it, however, for some reason, and so had still 
another survey conduct work. That is the difficult point the 
court struggles with, why, based on what, did Tom Boyer even 
commission Green. Tom Boyer, after having the Green survey; did 
not even approach his aunt, plaintiff, an elderly woman, and 
explain what he was doing or why. He merely acted and moved a 
fence. It certainly is unexplainable to the court why someone 
would so behave, whatever past disputes had existed between Vern 
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and Lyle could have and should have been forgotten long ago. Both 
were deceased. Tom Boyer, for whatever reason, continued to 
press the matter and asked for yet another survey. If such 
conduct is not in bad faith, it is certainly mystifying to the 
court. Tom Boyer seemed, however, to the court to be a sensible 
person in other areas of his life, Based on a consideration of 
all factors, many no doubt unknown to the court, the court cannot 
find his actions in bad faith. 
7. Defendants' position as to the boundary, after the 2003 
Green survey, is definitely not in bad faith and without support. 
No fees should be awarded to either party. There has been no 
wilful conduct and punitive damages are not awarded. 
8. Plaintiff has shown title to the land up to the boundary 
as found herein. Thus, plaintiff's causes of action for tortious 
conduct has been shown, but no damages have been proven. The 
court declares the boundary between sections 31 and 32 to be as 
herein described and quiets title accordingly. The fence should 
be removed as indicated below. No damages are awarded and of 
course no punitive damages. 
9. The court believes it probably cannot force this result 
or force any cooperation but believes that what makes sense in 
this c*$e is for the existing 2003 fence to be relocated to the 
boundary as found herein. It is a quality fence, lasting and 
effective for its purposes. Rather than have it torn down, new 
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materials purchased and a new "range" fence erected (which fence 
would require far more maintenance and possibly engender further 
disputes) it seems a practical solution for defendant to move the 
existing 2003 fence onto the new boundary. 
Plaintiff is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
^ day of C-DATED this I   L- ( / / , 2006. 
BY THE^COURT^ 
BRUCE C» LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT 
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ROBERT H. WILDE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
935 East South Union Avenue Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 255-4774 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
HELEN BOYER, A TRUSTEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS VERN BOYER & FEWKES 
CANYON, L.L.C.; 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 040500429 MJ 
Judge Bruce Lubeck 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
This matter came on regularly for trial to the court on 
September 27, 28, and 29, 2006. Plaintiff was represented by Ray 
G. Martineau and Brett D. Cragun and Defendants were represented by 
Robert H. Wilde. The court having previously made findings of fact 
and reached conclusions of law; 
Now therefore it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed; 
1. Title is quieted between Sections 31 and 32, Township 3 
North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in that the 
section line between these two sections is determined to run in a 
L:\D\12139\Judgment.vpd 1 
straight line in an approximately northern direction from the 
acknowledged common southern corner of the two sections to former 
location of the government monument at the existing south fence 
corner between sections 29 and 30 Township 3 North, Range 6 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, where the 1977-78 fence previously 
existed. 
2. The Plaintiff's claim for damages is denied. Damages were 
not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
3. There is no statute or contract which allows attorney 
fees in this matter. The request for attorney fees is denied. 
4. No bad faith was proven. The request for punitive damages 
is denied. 
5. The court urges the parties to cooperate in moving the 
fence from its current location to the section line found in 
paragraph one of tjiis order. 
DATED this )S 
-±r— 
Bruce C. Lubeck 
District Judge 
L:\D\12135\Judgmenc.wpd 2 
Delivery Certificate 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order and Judgment was mailed to the following via first class 
mail, postage prepaid thereon, this [0? day of N0l/lMW&^ , 
2006. 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
V^nno^> 
nc.vpd 
U/ji^jl^t 
STATE OF UTAH 
'. 38. 
County of Summit } 
I, Alan Spriggs, Summit County Recorder, State of Utah, designated as 
depositor for Survey plats filed in compliance with Section 17 23-17 Utah C* A9 
Annotated, do hereby certify that the attached is a full, true and correct copy of 
that certain £%%c&tW- filed on the /srTt, day of rVa^oL. 20 Q7 . 
as File No. (y S-£YKS. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and, 
official seal, this / ^ r day of Q^tJU^ , 2007 . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN BOYER, Trustee, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS VERN BOYER, FEWKES 
CANYON LLC, and DANNIE B. 
GREEN, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 040500429 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: February 7, 2006 
The above matter came before the court on February 6, 2006, 
for oral argument on various motions. Plaintiff was present with 
Ray G. Martineau, and defendants Boyer and Fewkes were present 
through Robert H. Wilde and defendant Green was present through 
John N. Braithwaite. 
Green filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative 
motion for summary judgment on August 31, 2005. Boyer and Fewkes 
filed a concurrence with the motion on September 6, 2005. 
Plaintiff filed an opposition response on October 4, 2005. 
Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 12, 2005. Green filed a 
reply on November 2, 2005, as well as a notice to submit. 
Boyer and Fewkes moved on October 12, 2005, to strike the 
expert report of Stahl. Plaintiff filed an opposition response on 
October 31, 2005. Boyer filed a reply on November 9, 2005. 
Plaintiff filed a notice to submit this motion on November 14, 
2005. 
Oral argument was scheduled previously and postponed and 
000234 
then held February 6, 2006. The court took the matter under 
advisement. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties, heard 
oral argument, and concludes as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint June 28, 2004. After motion and 
argument, the court allowed an amended complaint to be filed. 
Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on August 4, 2005. In 
summary, that complaint alleged plaintiff is the trustee of the 
L.E. Boyer and Helen W. Boyer Revocable Trust. The plaintiff 
alleged that she and her predecessors have an interest and record 
title in Section 31 TS3N, R6E in Summit County, which boundaries 
were set in 1875 by a U.S. Survey. Boyer and Fewkes have an 
interest in adjoining Section 32, and the complaint alleges that 
the common boundary between those two sections has been marked by 
a fence erected in 1977 or 1978. In July, 2003, defendant Boyer 
attempted to change the location of the boundary by removing the 
old fence which served as the boundary and erecting a new fence 
that impinges upon Section 31 owned by plaintiff. Green was 
engaged to survey the boundary in May 2002 by Boyer and it is 
alleged Boyer mislead Green by failing to provide certain 
documents, and Green negligently and unprofessionally failed to 
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perform his duties properly, and thus improperly advised Boyer as 
to the boundary. Green also filed a plat in December, 2004, and 
thus clouded title to Section 31. 
The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) tortious 
conduct against Boyer; (2) she seeks an order requiring Boyer to 
replace the old fence and remove the new fence; (3) alleges 
negligent conduct against Green in undertaking the survey; (4) 
seeks declaratory judgment as to the common boundary; and (5) 
seeks punitive damages against Boyer for his willful conduct. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. MOTION TO DISMISS, ALTERNATIVELY MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Green moves to dismiss under rule 12(b) (6), or alternatively 
for summary judgment on all claims against him, alleging those 
are for negligence and for wrongful lien and slander of title. 
Only causes three and four are alleged against Green. 
Green asserts as facts that he performed a survey at the 
behest of Boyer to determine the boundary of Section 32. Green 
filed a survey plat with the Summit County Surveyor's Office. 
As to the filing of the plat, Green contends that the fourth 
cause of action is for wrongful lien. The filing of the survey 
by Green under UCA 17-23-17 is not a wrongful lien, as it does 
not purport to create an encumbrance or lien on real property, 
and the filing of the plat is authorized by Utah statute. 
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Further, Green is not a lien claimant, as he claims no interest 
in any of the properties involved. Further, because under Utah 
law the plat was filed with the county recorder as there is no 
county surveyor, the filing was not with the recorder and so no 
wrongful lien could be created. 
As to the negligence claim, Green performed the work for 
defendant Boyer, not plaintiff, and he owed no independent duty 
to plaintiff. Contract duties ran to Boyer, not plaintiff. As 
there was no duty to plaintiff, no negligence claim can be valid. 
Green attaches his affidavit. 
In opposition, plaintiff disputes that Fewkes owns Section 
32 as there is a contest over a corner of that section. 
Plaintiff also disputes the survey by Green, alleging it was 
negligently performed. Plaintiff alleges earlier surveys, from 
1875 and 1974, showed the common boundary between Section 31 and 
32, and that boundary was marked by the fence erected in 
approximately 1978, well before defendant Boyer put up a new 
fence in 2003. A 1960 survey by Clark showed that there was a 
common corner between sections 29, 30, 31 and 32. A fence was 
erected based on that 1960 survey and it marked the boundary. In 
the early 1960s a survey was done by Burton which confirmed the 
fence as the north boundary of Section 31. In 1976 a survey was 
done by Malan on Section 32 which also confirmed the old fence as 
the common boundary. In 1978 Wilde undertook to retrace the Malan 
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survey for plaintiff's husband and did so, locating the stone 
that had been placed by Malan. Based on that, defendant Boyer 
installed a fence on the common boundary. In 1985 Christensen did 
a survey at the request of Boyer which confirmed the boundary. 
Boyer is claimed to have agreed in 1985 that the Malan, 
Christensen, and Wilde surveys accurately located the fence and 
common boundary. 
Boyer and Kent Henrie, owner of Section 29, hired Green in 
2002 and Green did a survey that year and prepared a plat 
purporting to place the location of the north end of the common 
boundary approximately 500 feet west of the common corner, 
thereby taking approximately 25 acres from Section 31 and adding 
them to Section 32. Boyer did not provide information he knew and 
had acknowledged to Green and Green did not find an affidavit on 
file with the county recorder concerning Sections 31 and 32, and 
Green, though aware of Wilde and his survey, did not contact him 
nor seek his input, nor did Green contact plaintiff and Green did 
not follow standard procedures for surveying. Boyer then wilfully 
removed the old fence he had previously erected and completed a 
new fence between Sections 31 and 32 according to the Green 
survey. Wilde has since then informed Green of his errors, but 
Green refuses to acknowledge those errors and will not amend his 
plat that was filed in December, 2004. Plaintiff argues there is 
a duty to neighboring landowners by surveyors, regardless of who 
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hires them, a duty in tort not affected by a contractual 
relationship. 
As to the lien claim, plaintiff claims again the plat was 
wrongly filed as it is incorrect, as the result of negligence. 
Even though Green is not a lien claimant, the statute provides a 
wrongful lien by any person may be compensable. 
In reply Green challenges plaintiff's disputes as not being 
relevant, as the issues are issues of law. The court should 
interpret the recording of the plat as a matter of law, not fact. 
Green asserts it is immaterial what the previous surveys showed 
or did not show. Green argues as a matter of Utah law there is 
no duty to plaintiff and thus there can be no negligence. As to 
the lien claim, Green again argues the plat was authorized by law 
to be recorded with the recorder instead of the surveyor, it was 
"filed" and not "recorded" and is simply not a lien. 
As to the slander of title claim, plaintiff has not alleged 
and cannot prove that any action of Green was with malice. 
Further, plaintiff can show no special damages. 
Boyer's arguments in favor of dismissal as to Green urge 
that plaintiff has at most alleged negligence against Green. The 
second amended complaint does not allege a wrongful lien. The 
complaint does not allege malice or wilfulness against Green. 
Plaintiff has not pleaded slander of title. Plaintiff has not 
relied on the survey which is allegedly defective. If the survey 
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is in error, plaintiff can be compensated and recover against the 
other defendants. If the survey is correct, there would be no 
damages. 
2. MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORT OF STAHL. 
Boyer moves to strike the expert report of John B. Stahl. 
Boyer argues that the Rule 26(f) plan was submitted and expert 
reports were to be submitted by April 30, 2005. Further, the 
report contains improper legal conclusions. 
Plaintiff opposes the motion. Plaintiff argues that she 
learned on December 15, 2004, that Green had filed his survey on 
December 10, 2004. Thus, plaintiff sought to add Green as a 
defendant and that was allowed July 18, 2005. Plaintiff had no 
reason to file an expert report until that was allowed. As to the 
content, that is for the weight and does not go to whether the 
report should be filed. 
In reply Boyer argues plaintiff has an expert, Wilde, and 
that Stahl is merely surplus and is late and if allowed as an 
expert, would have to be deposed. 
DISCUSSION 
2. MOTION TO DISMISS, OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The court treats the motion as one for summary judgment as 
there are attachments to the motion which have not been stricken. 
This is a most interesting question, made more difficult by 
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Green's reading of the complaint. The court does not read the 
complaint as does Green. 
Previously, the court allowed the second amended complaint 
so plaintiff could file a wrongful lien claim. The court does 
not see in the second amended complaint a direct cause of action 
for wrongful lien, though plaintiff and Green seem to agree such 
a cause of action is implied. As to Green, plaintiff alleges 
negligence in the third cause of action and in the fourth, seeks 
a declaratory judgment as to the boundary involved. The second 
amended complaint incorporates previous allegations, but none 
state directly, in the court's reading, that a wrongful lien is 
claimed. 
As to the wrongful lien claim, if there is one in the second 
amended complaint, the court believes it cannot stand. The court 
reads the wrongful lien statute as does Green. 
First, Green must be a lien claimant, a person claiming an 
interest in the property. The liability section, UCA 38-9-4, 
sets forth possible damages as to the actions of a lien claimant, 
not to "any person, " UCA 38-9-4(3), but to "a person" which 
refers to the previous subsections (1) and (2), which require a 
lien claimant. Plaintiff reads UCA 38-9-4(3) as allowing a claim 
by any person, and the court believes that statute applies only 
to lien claimants. 
Thus, the court need not consider whether this was a 
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"wrongful lien" under UCA 38-9-1(6), nor whether any exceptions 
thereunder apply. 
Green was not and is not a lien claimant and thus there was 
and is no wrongful lien filed by Green when he filed the plat. 
As to the negligence claim of the third cause of action, the 
court again determines this claim under the summary judgment 
standard. The court believes there are factual disputes about the 
nature of the survey, whether it is correct or not, and both 
parties agree there are disputes about the nature of the survey. 
As in any negligence claim, it is a rare case where summary 
judgment is proper. However, if there is no legal duty, factual 
disputes about whether there has been a breach of the duty are 
not important. 
Green asserts the court can and should determine as a matter 
of law that there was no duty owed to plaintiff and thus there 
can be no negligence as a matter of law, whatever the merits of 
the dispute about the validity of the survey. 
The court agrees with Green that it can and should determine 
if there is a duty owed as a matter of law. The court, as a 
matter of public policy, determines there is not a duty owed by a 
surveyor such that a tort of negligence will lie whenever a 
property owner claims the survey is incorrect under circumstances 
such as this case. If any adjoining property owner could claim 
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negligence against a surveyor who disagrees with other surveyors, 
there would be no reason whatever that defendant Boyer could not 
file a negligence claim against Kent Wilde or others who 
performed a previous survey. 
The court understands the concerns of plaintiff and 
expresses some sympathy for the situation and believes it is a 
close and interesting question. If a surveyor can file whatever 
survey plat he desires, without regard to its correctness 
(plaintiff's allegation herein, and the court is not stating that 
is what happened here) there ought to be a duty to adjoining land 
owners to make sure the survey is correct. This case shows the 
need, plaintiff asserts, as a policy matter, for such a duty. 
Had plaintiff desired to sell the property, the recorded plat, 
with the alleged incorrect boundary line, clearly causes possible 
damage to plaintiff. She cannot sell the property under the 
disputed boundary. The filing of the plat, though not subject to 
a claim of wrongful lien, certainly operates as an encumbrance on 
the property which adjoins the property Green was hired to 
survey. The court understands plaintiff's position that if 
certain acts were done or omitted, recovery should occur as there 
is a duty to neighboring landowners whose interest is affected by 
a survey. The court acknowledges that the survey could and has 
affected plaintiff, and an incorrect survey could obviously 
affect any neighboring land owners, and any survey which purports 
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to "give" land from one section to another clearly impacts more 
than the contracting parties to the survey. A loss of value of 
property is certainly an injury that, if caused by negligence, 
should be compensable. 
However, on balance, as a matter of public policy, where 
there allegations in this second amended complaint that will 
allow the court to determine the "correctness" of the various 
surveys that have been performed, plaintiff is not without a 
remedy. She is without a remedy against Green, or any other 
surveyor whose product disagrees with the product of other 
surveyors, but she is not without a remedy. 
If the courts were to allow, under the circumstances of this 
case, such a negligence claim to stand, defendant Boyer could 
file a negligence claim against any and all other surveyors who 
disagreed with the survey he commissioned, claiming they were 
negligently performed and contain incorrect information which 
over the years has caused damage to Boyer, as "taking" his 
property and being an improper encumbrance on his property. Boyer 
could claim he could have sold property belonging to him had he 
known the "true" acreage. While in this case plaintiff claims 
Green was incorrect, Boyer could then, if the court allowed this 
cause of action to remain, file an action against other surveyors 
and claim their filings were negligently performed. 
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In this case, each surveyor will presumably testify, and the 
court will make findings as to the "correct" boundary line, and 
issue declaratory judgment as to whether the boundary is where 
Green says it is or whether it is somewhere else, where other 
surveyors say it is. That does not mean that each surveyor 
should be liable if their work is incorrect, especially in this 
situation where there are remedies to find the "correct" 
boundary. Allowing negligence suits in such situations as this 
would create havoc. 
In other cases a negligence claim may lie against a 
surveyor, such as a case where a plat is filed by a surveyor and 
many people rely on its result to purchase land or otherwise rely 
on its incorrect information and can show damages as a result. 
Here, where there are competing surveys over a boundary line, 
there is no duty of a surveyor that is owed to one such as 
plaintiff, an adjoining property owner. 
Whether there was a breach of any professional duty remains 
to be determined at trial in the ultimate determination of the 
"correct" boundary, but the result will be a declaration of the 
boundary line and if plaintiff prevails, damages against 
defendant Boyer could be assessed. There should be no claim 
against Green for his survey or his filing of the plat. 
Thus, the court concludes there is no duty owed and so no 
negligence could be shown. Whether treated as a motion to 
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dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, the result is the same. 
There is no legal principle which allows recovery against Green. 
There is no factual dispute that alters the legal conclusion of 
the court as to duty owed. 
The parties argued about slander of title and whether that 
is included in the second amended complaint. The court again 
does not believe it is pleaded, and the second amended complaint 
certainly does not include a claim of malice to support a claim 
of slander of title against Green. Plaintiff suggests that she 
ought to be allowed to amend again and correct that deficiency if 
it exists. 
The court believes the declaratory judgment claim of the 
fourth cause of action remains and that claim offers plaintiff a 
remedy. 
No slander of title cause of action is in the complaint and 
to the extent it is "implied" it should be dismissed, as no 
malice has been pleaded and the court believes, even though it is 
not determining facts at this point, that no malice could be 
proven, even if plaintiff is able to show Green was told his 
survey was wrong. Again, to allow a survey to serve as a slander 
of title action would allow each surveyor to be sued in competing 
survey cases, such as this case. Each property owner relying on a 
survey could claim the other survey slandered their title. 
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The third cause of action is DISMISSED, Green's motion being 
GRANTED. 
The fourth cause of action for declaratory judgment remains, 
but not as a wrongful lien claim or as a slander of title claim. 
Green's motion is GRANTED as to the wrongful lien claim and 
slander of title, to the extent they are included in the 
complaint. 
2. MOTION TO STRIKE DEPOSITION OF STAHL. 
The court understands the timing involved and believes that 
based on plaintiff's claims and theories, the additional expert 
should be allowed to testify. No party is restricted in the 
number of experts, but of course the court will not allow 
needlessly cumulative testimony, even if it is from an expert. 
Plaintiff s timing was based on theories held by plaintiff, 
rejected above, but those theories are not without merit. 
Thus, the court will allow Stahl to be a witness. His 
testimony will be as that of any other expert, and his 
conclusions must not invade the legal province of the court. 
If defendant desires to depose Stahl, there will be time to 
do so. Assuming the trial is more than one day, any trial to be 
set will be several months from now. 
The court will not at this point affix fees or costs of the 
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deposition. That will be reserved for trial and the court will 
deal with whether plaintiff should be required to pay the fees 
and costs involved in deposing Stahl. 
The parties are to indicate clearly to each other 
immediately what experts will be called so defendants may 
determine whether to depose Stahl or not, and the court will not 
indicate now who will bear those costs at this point. 
The parties are to contact the scheduling clerk soon, in a 
joint telephone conference, so that a scheduling conference may 
be set with the court, who will then affix a trial date. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this day of Y' , 2006. 
BY TH& COUR 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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